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ABSTRACT
In the Dutch healthcare system, provider competition is used as a tool to improve
efficiency. From a competition policy perspective, little is known about how
collaboration among healthcare providers contributes to overall patient welfare,
and how a balance is achieved between scale benefits and preventing anti-
competitive collusion. This paper examines the ex-post effects of a Dutch case
study in which three competing hospitals have collaborated to provide high-
complexity low-volume cancer surgery, an arrangement that tests the limits of
permissibility under the Dutch cartel prohibition. Our preliminary empirical
research demonstrated only a modest increase in price and travel time for some of
the tumour surgeries. Volume analysis showed that the intended centralization of
surgical procedures has not been fully realized. Our findings highlight the impor-
tance of a comprehensive self-assessment by the collaborating hospitals to ex-ante
assess (potential) efficiencies and antitrust risks. Such self-assessments could
benefit from research focused on which collaborations are most appropriate to
achieve quality gains. For the ex-post assessment by competition authorities
following the cartel prohibition, a more thorough insight into the (long-term)
changes in hospital prices, profitability, and quality after collaboration is needed.
JEL: I11; I18; L50
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
When hospital competition is used as a tool for improving the efficiency
of healthcare (Barros et al., 2016) an interesting challenge arises from the
perspective of competition law and economics: i.e. how to deal with the
pros & cons of horizontal consolidation and coordination between (potential)
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competitors?1 To date, in the literature most attention is being paid to the ex-
ante scrutiny and ex-post effects of hospital consolidation. Empirical evidence
so far demonstrates that hospital mergers in general do not lower costs and/or
improve quality (Cooper et al., 2015; Gaynor et al., 2015; Broers and Kemp,
2017). In a recent study, including 246 acquired hospitals and 1986 control
hospitals that did not merge, Beaulieu et al. (2020) find that in the US hospital
consolidation did not result in significantly lower readmission or mortality
rates while it was associated with a modestly worsening in patient experiences.
Despite their growing importance, collaborations among hospitals have
not been subject to the same degree of scrutiny and scientific research
compared to mergers. Collaboration can be understood as intermediate or
hybrid (network) forms of coordination in which each hospital’ autonomy
is retained. A prominent example of collaboration between hospitals is a
clinical care network (Brown et al., 2016; De Regge et al., 2019). Quality
considerations—often operationalised as minimum volume standards—are
increasingly incentivizing hospitals to coordinate and/or concentrate their
delivery of (complex) treatments in these networks. This is especially true
for complex surgical procedures, since volume norms have been introduced
that require hospitals to perform a minimum number of surgeries for some
treatments (Morche et al., 2018). In general, these norms are prompted by the
volume-outcome relationship; i.e. performing a treatment more often results
in higher quality. This relationship is confirmed in literature, especially for
complex surgical procedures (Gaynor et al., 2005; Burgers et al., 2007; Ho
et al., 2007; Rademakers et al., 2012; Gooiker et al., 2014).
In this paper we study collaboration among hospitals within the market-
based Dutch hospital system, where the general prohibition on cartels applies.
Therefore, in the Netherlands all arrangements among hospitals are subject
to scrutiny under competition law. The increased use of collaborations in
hospital markets presents competition authorities with a difficult dilemma
(Broers and Kemp, 2017): how to achieve a balance between the potential
scale benefits of collaboration while at the same time safeguarding sufficient
competition and preventing anti-competitive collusion. Moreover, such cases
are highly complex for competition authorities to assess, since a thorough
antitrust assessment requires all patient welfare implications to be taken
into account, including effects on quality, price and accessibility. In the
international literature, Ho et al., (2007) were the first to incorporate both
quality, price and travel time effects into a single analysis in order to assess
the effects of the centralization of care. However, the existing literature
currently lacks both integrated ex-ante and ex-post evaluation studies of
horizontal collaboration between hospitals. This case study on collaboration
in the Dutch hospital market provides an interesting opportunity in this
context.
1 See for example (Baicker and Levy, 2013a).
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The case study involves plans drawn up by three hospitals to collaborate
intensively through a Comprehensive Cancer Network involving the provision
of high-complexity low-volume surgical procedures. The case was informally
approved by the Dutch competition authority (ACM) by means of an exten-
sively described informal opinion (See Box 1). This informal opinion, in
combination with three datasets containing confidential data on negotiated
hospital prices, patient volumes and patient travel times, allowed us to analyse
market outcomes shortly after implementation. As price and travel time
received less attention in the ex-ante informal opinion, most emphasis will be
placed on these potentially patient welfare reducing elements of collaboration.
The assessment of the quality effects (efficiencies) will be based on volume
analysis, complemented with a brief review of the contemporary literature.
The evaluation of the case study is relevant on three points. First, our study
provides insight into the challenges faced by hospitals aiming to improve the
quality of care through collaboration, as well as the competition authority who
is responsible for preventing anti-competitive collusion. Second, in contrast to
the more extensive body of research that is available on hospital mergers, little
is known about outcomes of hospital collaboration in terms of price, quality
and accessibility.This is an omission, because ‘collaboration-without-merging’
in networks is likely to play an increasingly important role in international
hospital markets under the influence of volume norms, costs containment and
a stricter approach by competition authorities towards hospital mergers.Third,
we demonstrate the possibilities and (data) restrictions in assessing ex-post
patient welfare effects of hospital collaboration.
The paper is structured as follows. After the case description (Box 1),
the first section briefly outlines the Dutch healthcare system and the role
of competition policy within it. In the second section, we will reflect on the
(potential) impact on prices, patient travel times2 and quality. Preliminary
empirical evidence on price and travel time effects is presented for this purpose.
The paper ends with the discussion and conclusion sections. Appendix 1
concerns an extensive case description, while Appendix 2 provides a detailed
description of our calculation of the preliminary price effects of the hospital
collaboration studied here.
Box 1: Case description
This study is based on ACM’s informal opinion of the collaboration between
three hospitals located in or near the city of Utrecht, the fourth largest city in
the Netherlands (See Figure 1). An informal opinion is a non-binding informal
2 Please note that the impact on travel time is included here because patients, although generally
willing to travel beyond their nearest provider for better care (Aggarwal et al., 2017), prefer
hospitals close to their homes. Loosing access to a hospital nearby for a particular service due to
centralization may therefore result in lower patient welfare. Additionally, increased travel times
for cancer care could reduce treatment uptake for specific patient groups (Parry et al., 2019).
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decision from the ACM on whether a proposed form of collaboration is presumed
to be permissible under the Competition Act, with the aim to provide guidance.3
The major reason for collaboration mentioned by the hospitals was to meet the
minimum volume standards for complex cancer surgery, which are set at twenty
procedures per hospital per year, averaged over three years.4 In the years 2011–
2014, the St. Antonius Hospital missed or only just met the volume standards for
esophageal, pancreatic and stomach cancer. The same was true for UMCU and
Meander Medical Center (MMC), concerning the volume norms for stomach
cancer. Among other changes, under the proposed collaboration St. Antonius
hospital would perform surgical procedures for pancreatic cancer and minor liver
tumours, UMCU hospital would perform surgical procedures for esophageal
cancer and major liver tumours and MMC hospital would perform surgical
procedures for stomach cancer and minor liver tumours.5 ACM informally
approved the proposed collaboration between the three hospitals in December
2015, after which the collaboration came into effect. The ACM assessed the likely
improvement in quality of the complex oncological surgery and the retention
of complex surgical procedures in the Utrecht region as beneficial for patients.
These positive effects of the collaboration were likely to outweigh potential
anti-competitive effects such as reduced freedom of choice and potential price
increases. The reduction in competition following the collaboration, argued the
ACM, would be permissible since the efficiencies would also benefit patients, as is
required in the exemption criteria of Article 6 (3) of the Competition Act. Another
important point for informal approval was the broad support for the collaboration
expressed by both the relevant health insurers in the region and the client councils
of the three hospitals. In the realized situation, depending on the geographical
market definition, the fascia count in the province of Utrecht decreases from three
hospitals to one hospital for each of the complex surgical procedures involved.
This implies a substantial increase inmarket share for the only hospital offering the
centralized procedure. The nearest alternative hospitals providing cancer surgery,
for instance pancreas procedures, are 35, 44 or 64 km away by car (as calculated
from UMCU). An extensive overview of the claimed efficiencies by the hospitals
and potential competition drawbacks can be found in Appendix 1.
B. The Dutch healthcare system
1. General overview
In the Netherlands, the healthcare system has undergone a major reform
in the recent decades. Strict government regulation has been replaced by
3 For the exemption criteria, See Article 6(3) https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0008691/
2019-01-01.
4 As shown by the annual BDOHospital Benchmark (see https://www.bdo.nl/en-gb/industries/hea
lthcare/benchmarks), none of the three hospitals was in financial distress.
5 The Netherlands has 73 hospital organizations, of which 66 are general hospitals and 7
are university hospitals (NVZ, 2018). In 2017, 27 hospitals performed liver resections, 17
hospitals performed stomach or esophageal surgery and 18 performed pancreas surgery (source:
minimumkwaliteitsnormen.nl).
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Figure 1. Map of the Netherlands (left) and the province of Utrecht (right),
showing the three collaborating hospitals, and travel times by car between their
locations.
a system based on the concept of managed competition (Enthoven, 1993;
Schut and van de Ven, 2011). A significant date in this process was 1 January
2006, from which point on the Health Insurance Act made private health
insurance mandatory for all residents of the Netherlands. A few months
later, on 1 October 2006, the Health Care Market Regulation Act came
into force, stipulating, among other things, the role of the newly established
Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa) as the regulatory and monitoring body for
the healthcare market (Maarse et al., 2016). These market-oriented reforms
resulted in a healthcare system organized around three interconnected sub-
markets in which the health providers, health insurers and patients interact.
Health insurers in the Netherlands are expected to act as prudent buyers
of healthcare services (Schut and Varkevisser, 2017). To fulfil this role,
each health insurer is expected to negotiate with healthcare providers on
price, quality and/or volume. Using selective contracting and/or financial
incentives for enrolees, health insurers are allowed—and to some extent,
expected—to steer patients to those healthcare providers that offer high-
quality care for a reasonable price (value for money ratio). Reallocating
the provision of complex treatments for the sake of quality by means of
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selective contracting can also be seen as one of the tasks of the health
insurers.
2. Stimuli for hospital competition
All Dutch hospitals are private non-profit foundations facing a legally binding
non-distribution constraint which prohibits them from distributing any net
earnings. Prior to the major health system reform described above, hospitals
were financed by a prospective budgeting systemwith regulated per diem rates.
This system resulted in fairly stable revenue flows for all hospitals. However,
since 2006 the hospitals’ revenues depend on their contract negotiations
with individual health insurers. These negotiations were facilitated by the
introduction of a detailed hospital product classification system categorizing
each patient into a Diagnosis Treatment Combination (DTC). These DTCs
include all hospital activities and services (both inpatient and outpatient)
associated with the patient’s demand for care, from the initial consultation
or examination to the final check-up. Over time, the number of DTCs for
which hospitals and insurers are permitted to negotiate prices (labelled as
the B-segment) increased from 10% of hospital revenues at the start, to
20% in 2008, 34% in 2009 and 70% in 2012. For the remainder of the
DTCs (labelled as the A-segment), including the most complex ones such
as organ transplantations, maximum prices are determined by the NZa.
In addition to competing for favourable contracts with health insurers,
hospitals also compete directly for patients (Schut and Varkevisser, 2017).6
Since the introduction of the new Dutch health care system, patients
are encouraged to make an active choice between alternative providers.
For example, by the provision of consumer information about hospital
quality.
3. Quality information
In addition to the supervision on the overall quality by the Health and Youth
Care Inspectorate is the public disclosure of quality information consid-
ered as an important perquisite for effective hospital competition. Although
research suggests the limited role of quality information in selecting healthcare
providers by patients (Damman et al., 2009; Faber et al., 2009), steps have
been taken in the Netherlands to increase transparency and comparability
of these sources. For the surgical procedures for liver, stomach, esophageal,
pancreas tumours hospitals are obliged to provide quality data to the National
Health Care Institute annually. These indicators include structure, process
6 Except for the university hospitals,most medical specialists in the Netherlands are self-employed
entrepreneurs organized in partnerships. These specialists receive a fixed payment for each
DTC. Hence, like the hospitals, these specialists have a financial interest in attracting more
patients.
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and outcome indicators, as for instance the number of patients in a year
who underwent surgery, standardized mortality rates, waiting times and length
of stay. Besides the National Health Care Institute, overarching professional
associations as the Dutch Institute for Clinical Auditing (DICA), also divulge
hospital quality indicators for oncological care. However, in the Netherlands
the development, selection and presentation of these quality indicators are
still work in progress, and both the comparability and accessibility are lag-
ging behind (KPMG, 2017). Recent Dutch research on oncological quality
indicators highlights that a well-informed hospital selection decision can only
be realized with tailored information, preferably outcome indicators, and for
a pro-active subset of the population (Salampessy et al., 2019). However,
although the publicly available hospital quality ratings are still far from perfect,
empirical research indicates that at least to some extent patients—or their GPs
offering advice about hospital choice—are sensitive to differences in observed
hospital quality (Beukers et al., 2014; Varkevisser et al., 2012).
C. Antitrust enforcement for collaboration agreements
In the Netherlands, collaboration agreements between companies are assessed
under the Competition Act (Mededingingswet), which came into effect in
1998 and is based on EU competition law. Collaboration—the form of
coordination that we focus on in this paper—can be impermissible under
the Competition Act if the objective of that collaboration is anti-competitive,
or if it leads to anti-competitive effects (Loozen, 2015). The Authority for
Consumers & Markets (ACM) is responsible for applying the Competition
Act in all competitive markets, including the market for healthcare.7 The
supervision of cartel prohibition is relevant when there is an agreement of
cooperation between (potentially) competing companies and is defined in
article 6(1) of the Competition Act. Article 6(3) provides exemption criteria
that allow for agreements to be permitted, even though those agreements
would be deemed anti-competitive.8 Generally, the ACM will not initiate
an investigation of its own accord in cases where healthcare providers can
substantiate in a convincing ex-ante self-assessment that the benefits for
patients outweigh any anti-competitive effects of collaboration. Furthermore,
all relevant stakeholders (e.g. health insurers, patient organizations) must also
verify and approve the plan.
7 For the entire description of the Competition Act (MW), please see: http://wetten.overheid.nl/
BWBR0008691/2016-07-01 (in Dutch).
8 For the exemption criteria, see Article 6(3): https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0008691/
2019-01-01 (in Dutch).
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II. REFLECTION9
A. Potential price effects
From a welfare perspective, collaborations can lead to inefficiencies due to
increased hospital prices. To assess the potential price effects associated with
the collaboration studied in this paper, insight into patient volumes at all three
hospital locations is required. It can be seen in Table 1 that post-collaboration
the centralization has not (yet) been fully materialised for two tumour types.
For stomach tumours and pancreas tumours, the percentage of patients that
was treated in the hospital where the centralization would take place equalled
70% and 81%, respectively. Only for esophageal tumours, the centralization
has been fully realised; 100% of the patients underwent surgery in the same
hospital. Table 2 shows the indices on which prices were compared with the
nationwide average price for the three specific procedures in 2015 (index
100). The method for the calculation of these indices is extensively outlined
in Appendix 2. For the indices, we used negotiated prices between hospitals
and health insurers as the best available operationalization for any prices effect.
The price effect can be subdivided into two sources: in column A and B we
assess the potential occurrence of a concentration effect, while in column C
we investigate whether there is any indication of a price effect through the
reallocation of care. Column D was included to simulate the price based on
the proposed situation, as Table 1 indicates that the proposed allocation in one
hospital has not been fully consummated.10 It is important to stress that our
analysis should only be regarded as a tentative insight into post-collaboration
price effects based on the available data.11
To clarify the indices presented in Table 2, we will first discuss the occur-
rence of a potential concentration effect. That is, the hospitals’ potential
behavioural change of operating in a now less competitive environment. In
column A and column B, we compare the years 2015 and 2017 given a
9 In this section, we present preliminary empirical evidence for the price and travel-time effects
of the collaboration studied in the paper. We do this for the esophageal, stomach and pancreas
procedures, and will not present data on liver procedures. For liver tumors, it is important to
make the distinction betweenmajor andminor tumors in order to assess at which location which
patient will be treated. We were not able to make this distinction based on the current data.
10 It should be noted that we used the situation in which care is provided at one hospital as what
would happen without collaboration (counterfactual) instead of 0 hospitals, which refers to
the complete disappearance of the tumour surgery in the region. Although the latter scenario
was brought forward by the hospitals (Section A of Appendix 1), this counterfactual is highly
implausible for three reasons. First, pre-collaboration volumes were sufficiently high enough for
insurers to contract at least one hospital, and for some tumours even two hospitals. Second,
as selective contracting occurs rarely, not contracting any hospital in the Utrecht region would
lead to considerable reputational damage for the health insurers. Third, it is highly implausible
to not contract the university hospital as it has an important region function and the nearest
other university hospitals are located 42, 64 and 88 km away.
11 Due to the limitations of our analysis, which are outlined in the discussion section, conclusions
regarding causality between the abuse of market power and price changes could not be drawn.
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Table 1. Percentage of total patient volume centralized in one hospital after collaboration
Realised Promised
Stomach tumours 70% 100%
Pancreas tumours 81% 100%
Esophageal tumours 100% 100%
Table 2. Index prices pre-collaboration and post-collaboration for stomach, pancreas and
esophageal12 tumours.13
A
(2015 prices,
2015 case-mix)
B
(2017 prices,
2015 case-mix)
C
Realised
(2017 prices.
2017 case-mix)
D
Consummated
as proposed
(2017 prices,
2017 case-mix,
procedure fully
centralized in
one hospital)
Stomach tumours
Nationwide 100 105 110
Three hospitals 103 101 121 123
Pancreas tumours
Nationwide 100 111 111
Three hospitals 105 123 104 101
Esophageal tumours
Nationwide 100 113 111
Three hospitals 134 137 139 139
constant case-mix and no re-allocation of care. For stomach procedures, a
nationwide price increase of 5 percentage points between 2015 and 2017
is visible (index 105 compared to 100); in the three hospitals concerned in
the Utrecht case study, we observe a price decrease of 2 percentage points
(index 101 compared to 103). Since the nationwide price increase was larger
than the price increase at the three Utrecht hospitals, the three hospitals do
not seem to have exercised their market power to demand higher prices. For
pancreas procedures, larger price differences are observed. The price increase
at the three Utrecht hospitals between 2015 and 2017 (18 percentage points,
12 Negotiated hospital prices are confidential and competition sensitive, and the exchange of
information regarding these prices is forbidden. We therefore made several modifications to
the data: 1) we use indices to compare with nationwide prices; 2) every treatment consists of
multiple DTC codes; 3) every DTC code consists of multiple prices negotiated by multiple
health insurers; 4) the prices are based on averages over the three hospital centres.
13 In addition to the ‘eyeball test’presented in Table 2, we performed a, due to data limitations,
simple Difference-in-Differences test on comparing column A to C. No significant differences
were found. For confidentiality reasons, no standard deviations from the indices are presented
here.
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index 123 compared to 105) was larger than the nationwide price increase (11
percentage points, index 111 compared to 100). This could indicate a small
concentration effect. Substantial differences are also observed for esophageal
procedures: pre-collaboration, the 2015 prices at the three Utrecht hospitals
were higher than the nationwide group (134 compared to 100). However, the
price increase at the three hospitals between 2015 and 2017 (3 percentage
points, index 137 compared to 134) was lower than the nationwide increase
(13 percentage points, index 113 compared to 100). This difference does not
indicate the presence of a concentration effect.
Although we find no clear signals for anti-competitive price increases, we
know from the literature that higher hospital market shares are generally
associated with higher prices (e.g. Gaynor et al., 2015). As the prices are
freely negotiable B-segment prices, healthcare providers have the possibility
to ask for higher prices. Also for the Netherlands, there are indications that
in more competitive regional hospital markets, measured by HHI or weighted
market shares (LOCI),14 prices are lower (Berden et al., 2019) and quality is
higher (Croes et al., 2018).However,most research onmarket power in relation
to price effects applies to consummated hospital mergers (Haas-Wilson and
Garmon 2011; ACM, 2017; Lewis and Pflum, 2017). It is not yet clear to what
extent through collaborating, as opposed to merging, hospitals can acquire
market power in submarkets and the effect this may have on prices.
Furthermore, we assess price differences caused by the allocation of
patients. Insight into this separate source of potential price increase is relevant
to assess, since the allocation is not coordinated centrally by health insurers or
government bodies but is rather determined by the three hospitals involved.
Therefore, strategic motives may have had influence on the allocation decision
next to medical or patient safety reasons. For instance, hospitals or self-
employed medical specialists may have interest in attracting the procedures
with the largest price-cost margins. Although we do not possess price data
detailed enough to draw conclusions on the latter, comparing column B and
Cmight indicate the occurrence of any allocation effect. For stomach tumours,
this comparison demonstrates a price increase for the collaborating hospitals
of 20 percentage points (index 121 compared to 101), which is higher than the
5 percentage point nationwide price increase. Contrary, for pancreas tumours,
the price increases were lower (19 percentage points, index 104 compared to
123) than the nationwide price development, which showed no difference
at all. For esophageal tumours, we find a fairly similar price development
among the nationwide group and among the three hospitals. However, the
price level of the three hospitals for esophageal tumours is much higher than
the nationwide price level.
14 LOCI refers to a competition index developed for differentiated product oligopoly markets with
logit demand (Akosa Antwi et al., 2013).
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Since for both columns B and C the 2017 prices are used, differences in
the overall price level could be explained by three potential reasons related to
allocation of patients. First, post-collaboration, more patients could be treated
in a more expensive hospital. This could be an indication of a potential allo-
cation effect. That is, a price increase because procedures were concentrated
in a hospital that had higher prices before the collaboration.More patients are
then treated for these higher prices, which can result in an upward overall price
level after collaboration. This is likely to be the case for the centralization in
a university hospital, which generally has higher prices (Douven et al., 2019).
Second, it could be the case that the patient population was more complex
in 2017 compared to the 2015 patient population (case-mix effect). Third, in
addition to a potential case-mix effect, price differences might also be caused
by upcoding, implying that a larger share of patients was registered under more
complex DTC-codes (Van Herwaarden et al., 2020).
As outlined in Table 1, the centralization has not been fully consummated
by the collaborating hospitals. Therefore, we simulated the consummated as
proposed situation in column D to see whether the non-compliance to the
assessed plan resulted in any differences in prices. Column D reflects the
situation described in the collaboration plan; i.e. where all treatments would
have been centralized in one particular hospital. For stomach tumours, this
exercise revealed that the price would then have risen further (123 compared
to 121) whereas the price for pancreas tumours would have been lower (101
compared to 104). Presumably, the small increase for stomach tumours is
caused by the patients that are still treated in the non-university hospital,
which has lower prices. The completion of the proposed centralization in the
university hospital would result in slightly higher overall prices. For esophageal
tumours, the centralization has been fully realized and therefore a similar index
(139) is visible in column C and D.
To summarize, price developments seem to vary for tumour types: the
potential price effect of a reduction in competition in comparison to the
price effect of other allocation related factors. For stomach tumours, the most
substantial price increase is visible, likely caused by the centralization in the
university hospital. For pancreas tumours, prices have risen from 2015 to
2017, but this effect has been negated through the centralization in a less
expensive hospital. For esophageal tumours, prices in all columns are sub-
stantially higher than the nationwide prices. However, the price development
does not differ from the nationwide price development. Overall, we do not
find a substantial price effect for the three surgical procedures included in the
collaboration agreement.
B. Potential travel time effects
Centralization could potentially increase the travel burden on patients (Mid-
delveldt et al. 2018). Since patients generally dislike travelling for treatment,
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Table 3. Mean travel time in minutes, pre-collaboration
Stomach tumours Pancreas tumours Esophageal tumours
Nationwide 24 28 28
UMCU 21 29 25
MMC 20 19 15
St. Antonius 17 16 21
Figure 2. Differences in travel time (minutes) compared to the pre-collaboration
situation for the three tumour types.17
this could result in significant disutility for some patients, both in terms of
increased travel costs and additional travel time (opportunity costs).15 Based
on patients’ places of residence in 2015, we calculated how far patients had
to travel for treatment in the pre-collaboration situation (Table 3), and how
much their simulated post-collaboration travel time would differ from this
(Figure 2).16 We refer to ‘simulated’ post-collaboration travel time because
we calculated how far 2015 patients would have had to travel under the new
collaboration arrangements, based on actual patient flows and travel times.
15 See, for example, the comprehensive overview of patient choice literature by Aggarwal et al.
(2017).
16 Using claims data from Vektis, we were able to determine where patients lived and at which
hospital they were treated in 2015. The database includes data on 99% of Dutch citizens
collected from all Dutch health insurers. Based on research by Varkevisser et al. (2012), travel
times (in minutes) are defined as the fastest route by car from the patient’s home to the relevant
hospital.
17 St Antonius hospital has two locations. The complex procedures are performed mainly at the
location Nieuwegein. We therefore used this location’s postcode for calculating travel times.
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The mean travel time for patients from the three hospitals, as reported
in Table 3, is generally slightly lower than the nationwide mean travel time.
UMCU reports the highest travel time of the three hospitals for each pro-
cedure, which could be explained by the fact that university hospitals—
which serve as centers of excellence—generally serve a wider geographical
area than general hospitals. Figure 2 shows the travel time differences per
patient for the three tumour types. The large bar at zero represents patients
who would have received treatment at the same hospital post-collaboration
as pre-collaboration, or for whom the travel time to the new hospital would
be unchanged post-collaboration. The negative values on the left tail indicate
a decrease in travel time. This implies that these patients bypassed their
nearest hospital in the pre-collaboration situation, since their travel time post-
collaboration situation would be shorter. The values on the right indicate an
increase in travel time. The largest increases in travel time are observed for
pancreatic tumours: 17 patients would have travelled 11–15 minutes further.
On average, this equates to a relative increase in travel time of 56 per cent for
this group, ranging from 15 per cent to 120 per cent extra travelling time. This
group thus might suffer a double utility loss; i.e. patients have to travel further,
and are obliged to undergo surgery in a less-preferred hospital, or at least not
their first choice hospital.
As illustrated in Figure 2, for the majority of the patients the post-
collaboration travel times would not have differed substantially from
the situation before the collaboration. This is unsurprising, as the three
collaborating hospitals are all located within proximity of one another in
the same city (in Utrecht) or very nearby (in Amersfoort). These findings
provide no clear indication of any increase in patients’ travel burden.However,
even a small relative increase could be disadvantageous for time-sensitive
patients, as well for more vulnerable patient groups such as elderly patients or
patients of low socio-economic status (Stitzenberg et al., 2009; Balan, 2017;
Versteeg et al., 2018). In general, negative effects on travel times resulting
from collaboration are likely to be limited for patients in the Netherlands
compared to travel time differences in more sparsely populated countries such
as the United States, due to the small size of the Netherlands and the absence
of remote areas (Birkmeyer, 2003; Stitzenberg et al., 2009; Mesman et al.,
2017). However, given the very densely populated area and three very close
hospitals, the travel time differences found in the current Utrecht case may
not be entirely representative of potential travel time differences that would
result from centralization at hospitals in other, less densely populated areas of
the Netherlands.
Other aspects regarding accessibility related to centralization also deserve
attention. First, collaboration that aims to centralize care will reduce patients’
freedom to make a decision based on their own preferences to some extent,
whether these preferences relate to travel time, quality or other hospital
attributes (Balan, 2017).This may apply particularly to the patients in Figure 2
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who report a longer pre-collaboration travel time, and who thus initially (i.e.
in the pre-collaboration situation) chose a hospital that was further away. In
addition to the absolute travel time differences caused by collaboration, it is
therefore important to take patients’ willingness to travel into account, and
this varies between quality-sensitive and time-sensitive patients. In its informal
opinion, the ACM assumed that patients were willing to travel further for
better care for complex procedures. This argument is partly supported by the
relevant academic literature: it has been shown that some patients are more
inclined to travel further for higher quality of care, to a certain extent at least
(Tanke and Ikkersheim, 2012; Ikkersheim et al., 2013; Gutacker et al., 2016;
Middelveldt et al., 2018; Vallejo-Torres et al., 2018).
Second, in theUtrecht case, there is a clear distinction between the locations
where diagnosis, surgery and pre- and after care are provided. This implies
that the travel time differences shown in Figure 2 may be an underestimation
of the actual travel time following the centralization, since patients would
need to transfer between locations during the care process. More importantly,
this also leads to additional transfer moments which can be unpleasant and
cause distress to cancer patients, as well as their relatives (Payne et al., 2000;
Vallejo-Torres et al., 2018). The possible move away from a familiar and
preferred hospital and surgeon may also be perceived negatively by patients
and their relatives, although these implications are more difficult to quantify
(Payne et al., 2000; Schwartz et al., 2017; Middelveldt et al., 2018).
C. Quality
In the current case, the rationale for the collaboration between the hospitals
was to meet the medical professionals’ minimum volume standards for rare
types of cancer. In the Netherlands, the current threshold for the types of
cancer included in the collaboration is set at 20 procedures per year. From
this perspective, for some cancer surgeries centralization could be deemed
necessary for the hospitals. However, based on our 2017 volume analysis in
Table 1, it can be concluded that the centralization has not fully been realised.
For stomach and pancreas tumours, also after the start of the collaboration
a share of surgical procedures has still been performed in other hospitals
than intended. As a result, even post centralization the actual number of
surgical procedures in these hospitals is much lower than the minimum
volume threshold of 20 procedures per year. This finding contradicts—and
even undermines—the quality claims brought forward by the collaboration
hospitals. Additionally, it should be noted that while the collaboration purely
focuses on volume this itself is a means rather than an end. As the hospitals
themselves argued in the informal opinion: “Through centralization and special-
ization for complex oncological surgery,survival rates and quality of live will improve,
due to reduced post-operative complications.” In the absence of reliable quality
data, it is not yet possible to say whether the collaboration has indeed led
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to higher quality, although the volume-outcome relationship for the involved
surgical procedures in the Utrecht is confirmed in the literature (e.g. Gooiker
et al., 2014). An inhibiting factor in most international volume-quality studies
is that the mechanism underlying the volume-quality relationship is often
not explicitly stated (Harrison, 2012; Mesman et al., 2015). In practice,
the existence of the volume-outcome relationship can be attributed to a
combination of different mechanisms, as for instance (1) the learning effects
for surgeons (practice-makes-perfect), (2) the organizational scale size, and
(3) a reversed causation by selective referrals; i.e. hospitals or physicians that
show better outcomes attract more patients (Gaynor et al., 2005; Luft et al.,
1987).Moreover, the occurrence of the volume outcome relationship is highly
dependent of contextual factors, which vary according to the procedure in
question. In the current case, centralization was also paired with specific
attributes that could influence the volume-quality relationship positively or
negatively. For instance, pre- and post-operative care is separated from the
surgical procedures, surgery is performed by two multidisciplinary teams,
and diagnoses are handled at one location. Since the underlying mechanisms
and desired quality improvements are unclear, it was ex-ante difficult for
the competition authority to assess whether the generally claimed benefits of
increased scale would also apply for this case with its specific characteristics.
However, ex-post no further research was conducted as well. Neither was any
study carried out as to whether collaborations like this one might reduce the
incentives for quality competition. A growing body of literature demonstrates
the potentially positive effects of hospital competition on quality (Bloom
et al., 2015; Escarce et al., 2006; Gaynor et al., 2015), which implies that the
benefits of collaboration are (partly) offset by reduced competition on hospital
outcomes.18
III. DISCUSSION
Also in market-based health systems, like in the Netherlands, collabora-
tion between hospitals in clinical care networks is becoming increasingly
widespread. This trend is likely to continue due to the influence of both
external and internal factors, such as changes in demand, a smaller workforce,
stricter volume norms and a stricter approach to mergers on the part of
competition authorities (Broers and Kemp, 2017; Glied and Altman, 2017).
However, little is known about the total patient welfare effects of collaboration
agreements between healthcare providers in competitive markets. From a
competition policy perspective, insight into these effects is required in order to
enforce antitrust regulations effectively. Uncertainty regarding the conditions
18 The focus of this literature is on the negative ex-post quality effects of reduced competition
caused by hospital integration through mergers rather than by collaboration (Gaynor and Town,
2012; Significant, 2016; Vogt and Town, 2006).
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under which collaboration is permissible could encourage mergers between
hospitals. This is undesirable because mergers can result in permanent and
unfavourable changes in the market structure (Schmid and Varkevisser, 2016).
In this article, we have discussed a case study involving three Dutch hospi-
tals to illustrate three aspects that are considered important in any evaluation
of patient welfare: quality, price and travel times. For two of the three tumour
types included in the collaboration, our preliminary findings indicate lower
prices compared to the nationwide price development. However, for stomach
tumours, a price increase is found, although this price difference is small.
In absolute terms, the calculation of travel time effects revealed a modest
increase in the travel burden for patients. Quality gains resulting from the
collaboration were not possible to assess at this stage. However, an analysis of
patient volumes revealed that the centralisation—and thus the collaborating
hospitals’ quality claims—has no (yet) be fully materialised.
A. Limitations
Our study should be regarded as an initial exploratory investigation in which
several limitations apply.
First, in the absence of cost prices or margins, it is questionable whether
negotiated prices are sufficiently suitable as an indicator of price effects. These
prices are composed of individual DTC prices. Douven et al. (2019) argue
that the setting of DTC prices is somewhat arbitrary and serves primarily
an instrumental purpose in the annual overall turnover negotiations between
hospitals and health insurers, which hampers the validity of DTC prices.
In our study, we have focused on three surgical treatments, each consisting
of several DTCs. The effect of individual DTC prices may therefore be
mitigated because we calculated the average cost per patient. This introduces
a (potential) aggregation bias, but for reasons of confidentiality we are not
able to disaggregate the price effect.19 Second, negotiations between health
insurers and health providers are complex and include volume agreements,
cross subsidies and joint negotiations for a set of DTCs. For example, hospitals
may have agreed with health insurers that higher prices for specific DTCs
would be accompanied by treating fewer patients under these more expensive
DTCs. This could result in lower overall spending. Finally, our descriptive
comparison does not exclude the possibility of confounders that may have
influenced price changes. In general, our ex-post study concerns the period
just after implementation, which may underestimate or overestimate the actual
collaboration effects.
19 When examining the price effects of a Dutch hospital merger, Roos et al. (2019) indeed find
evidence of heterogeneous price effects across health insurers, hospital products and hospital
locations. These differences depend on the degree of substitution between hospitals, the relative
bargaining ability of hospitals and insurers, and the pre-merger price-cost margins of different
products delivered by these hospitals.
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B. Challenges
Overall, our findings highlight three important challenges for collaborating
hospitals as well as competition authorities assessing such arrangements.
First, with regards to the current enforcement method for collaborations,
the burden of proof for efficiency claims rests with the healthcare providers
concerned. In contrast to merger control, the prohibition on cartels is enforced
retrospectively. Our case clearly illustrates the complexity of ex-post assess-
ment, and any ex-ante estimation would thus be even more complex, both for
healthcare providers and competition authorities. An effective self-assessment
by healthcare providers regarding whether the proposed collaboration com-
plies with competition rules is therefore an essential prerequisite. Healthcare
providers should therefore be encouraged to provide insight into the utility
and necessity of the proposed collaboration in accordance with the exemption
criteria, and efficiency claims should be supported with relevant literature.
With respect to quality, the argumentation provided should be required
to take a broader perspective than purely focusing on minimum volumes.
The mechanism that underlies the (assumed) relationship between quality
and volume, as well as the contextual factors that affect this, should also
be addressed. This would require more robust substantiation on the part
of the applicants, and it is questionable whether all healthcare providers
would be sufficiently equipped to demonstrate the net benefits of collabo-
ration in this way. Additionally, the current enforcement method requires
competition authorities to have the knowledge and ability to assess appli-
cations, and where necessary to refute or expand on the argumentation
presented.
Second, for a convincing burden of proof, the self-assessment should
ideally be complemented with a scenario analysis to ensure a more com-
prehensive approach to the best-case and worse-case scenarios. Our ex-post
research could be an example of how healthcare providers could utilise their
own patient data for ex-ante calculations of the impact of collaboration
on travel times in a practical manner. Similarly, the allocation effect could
be calculated ex-ante in order to determine the potential implications of
concentration at one hospital and could be used in the discussion regarding
the extent to which price increases would be justified by quality gains.
However, one debate that arises concerns who is responsible for conducting
these analyses: the healthcare providers, health insurers or the competition
authority? The former (or a trusted consultant/third party) is not legally
allowed to share this competition-sensitive information directly, while the
latter lacks the capacity and resources to do so for every collaboration
agreement.
In addition to the complexity involved in the self-assessment and the related
division of tasks, the third challenge is more fundamental and relates to the
initiator of collaboration. In the current case, the healthcare providers initiated
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and designed the allocation of the tumour types among the hospitals.However,
requesting an exemption on the cartel prohibition would not have been
necessary if health insurers had used their selective buying power by means
of selective contracting. The role of health insurers in the current case was
limited to examining and approving the plan presented by the providers.More
proactive intervention by health insurers could result in a shift in emphasis
towards value-for-money considerations.This wouldmatch the role of prudent
buyers of health care that insurers—or other third-party payers—are expected
to play in a market-based health system.
C. Further research
Further ex-post research is required in order to investigate the patient welfare
effects of collaboration and centralization agreements in greater depth. To
support both the competition authorities and healthcare providers in their
ex-ante substantiation of their claims, future research should provide insight
into the effects of cases of collaboration and offer competition authorities
the opportunity to steer or enforce in response to indications that anti-cartel
regulations have been broken. We recommend that future work includes
research questions on whether and how quality benefits are actually realized
in the context of collaboration, and whether and which collaborations are
the right instruments to achieve the intended quality gains. Finally, further
research is required into whether the establishment of collaboration between
hospitals is associated with anti-competitive drawbacks. For this purpose, any
post-collaboration changes in (disaggregated) prices and included price-cost
margins need to bemonitored closely, as these provide amore thorough insight
into the occurrence of any anti-competitive behaviour.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discussed the potential patient welfare implications of
collaboration arrangements between three hospitals providing complex cancer
surgery in the Netherlands. Based on the informal opinion issued by the
competition authority and additional empirical research, we found only a
modest increase in price and travel time for some of the tumour types
included in the collaboration. Volume analysis showed that the intended
centralization of surgical procedures has not been fully realized. Our findings
highlight the importance of a comprehensive self-assessment by the collabo-
rating hospitals to assess efficiencies and risks ex-ante. From the competition
policy perspective, a comprehensive self-assessment (e.g. based on the relevant
literature) by the collaborating hospitals is required in order to reveal the
most important pros & cons of the aimed collaboration. Such assessments
could benefit from research focused on the ex-post evaluation of the quality
effects of collaboration. That is, when are the claimed efficiencies most likely
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to occur? For the ex-post assessment on the cartel prohibition by competition
authorities, a more thorough insight into the (long-term) changes in hospital
prices, profitability, and quality is needed.
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A. APPENDIX
A.1. Centralization of complex oncological care in the Utrecht region
Before implementing their plan, the hospitals asked the ACM to assess their
argumentation for the collaboration by issuing an informal opinion regarding
their plans. An informal opinion is a non-binding informal decision from
the ACM on whether a proposed form of coordination is presumed to be
permissible under the Competition Act. It is issued with the aim of providing
the parties involved with guidance. Generally, informal opinions are issued at
the request of the relevant parties and when (1) the proposed arrangements
have not yet been implemented and concern a new legal question, (2) when the
issue is of economic or societal importance (3) and when enough information
has been provided by the parties to form an informal opinion,without the need
for the ACM to conduct its own in-depth study.
This collaboration, which was proposed by the hospitals in 2014/2015,
concerns three points: (1) the joint establishment of treatment plans for
individual patients by physicians through a multidisciplinary meeting; (2) the
introduction of a common healthcare protocol and process for different types
of tumours and the exchange of expertise; and (3) the centralization of surgical
procedures for each form of liver, esophageal, pancreatic and stomach cancer
in one or two of the hospitals concerned. Our prime focus in this study is
on the centralization of the latter procedures. Under the proposed collab-
oration, after centralization, St. Antonius hospital would perform surgical
procedures for pancreatic cancer and minor liver tumours,UMCUwould per-
form surgical procedures for esophageal cancer and major liver tumours and
MMC would perform surgical procedures for stomach cancer and major liver
tumours.20
20 The Netherlands has 73 hosptials, of which 66 are general hospitals and 7 are university
hospitals (NVZ, 2018). In 2017, 27 hospitals performed liver resections, 17 hospitals performed
stomach or esophageal surgery and 18 performed pancreas surgery (source: miniumukwaliteit-
snormen.nl).
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A.1.1 The efficiencies claimed by the hospitals
The major reason for collaboration given by the hospitals was to meet the
minimum volume standards for complex cancer surgery. In the Netherlands,
these standards are determined by SONCOS, a foundation in which all
professional organizations for oncological care in the Netherlands participate.
The volume standards for liver, esophageal, pancreatic and stomach cancer
surgery are set at twenty procedures per hospital per year, averaged over three
years. The three hospitals argued that they would only be able to meet these
volume standards if they worked together; otherwise, they feared that high-
complex oncological care may disappear from the region since health insurers
would no longer contract the individual hospitals because they would not meet
the volume requirements. In the years 2011–2014, the St. Antonius Hospital
missed or only just met the volume standards for esophageal, pancreatic and
stomach cancer. The same was true for UMCU and MMC, concerning the
volume norms for stomach cancer.
The three hospitals argued that patients would benefit from this collab-
oration because specialization and higher volumes would improve care out-
comes, improving survival rates and quality of life and reducing postoperative
complications. They also argued that the continued availability of complex
cancer care in the Utrecht region would be a further major advantage of
the collaboration. The hospitals also emphasized that collaboration on high-
complexity cancer care would not go beyond what was necessary to achieve the
volume norms: the centrization of care in one hospital would only apply to the
surgical procedures themselves. Pre- and postoperative care would continue
to be provided by the hospital of the patient’s choice.
A.1.2 Antitrust assessment by the ACM
In response of the efficiency claims outlined by the hospitals, the ACM’s
informal opinion considered two potential anti-competitive effects: reduced
freedom of choice and the possibility of price increases. The concentration
of surgical procedures in one hospital rather than three hospitals reduces
absolute freedom of choice. In the status quo situation, patients and health
insurers would be able to choose between the three hospitals in the region. In
the proposed new situation, however, the hospitals would decide on behalf of
the patient where surgery would take place. Additionally, it was possible that
relative freedom of choice would be restricted by the proposed arrangements,
since the hospitals would aim to standardize the care process for complex
oncological care by establishing joint treatment plans. The effect of this
approach would be a more harmonized and standardized care process. Hospi-
tals may therefore offer very similar treatment plans, decreasing patient choice
regarding aspects such as quality of care. However, the hospitals claimed that
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choice would remain available regarding other aspects of care, such as the level
of service for pre- and post-operative care.
Second, the hospitals may be subject to less competitive pressure, reducing
the incentives for cost-efficiency and quality. Hospitals could also abuse their
market position by negotiating higher prices with health insurers. Finally,
the collaboration could result higher costs due to duplication in healthcare
processes caused by the potential complexity of providing care at several
locations (the location for the surgical procedure may be different from the
location of pre- and post-operative care, such as chemotherapy), as well in
higher management and coordination costs.
But in spite of these possible anti-competitive aspects of the collaboration,
the ACM informally approved the proposed collaboration between the three
hospitals in December 2015. Accepting the efficiency claims outlined by the
hospitals, the competition authority argued that the positive effects of the
collaboration were likely to outweigh the negative effects on competition. The
ACM assessed the likely improvement in quality of the complex oncological
surgery and the retention of complex surgical procedures in the Utrecht
region as beneficial for patients. The reduction in competition following the
collaboration, argued the ACM, would be permissible since the efficiencies
would also benefit patients, as stated in Article 6 (3) of the Competition Act.
Another important point in the approval of the ACMwas the broad support for
the collaboration expressed by both the relevant health insurers in the region
and the client councils of the three hospitals.21 For example, the largest and
therefore most important health insurer in the region argued that it would
continue to have sufficient countervailing purchasing power even after the
collaboration.
Following the informal approval by the ACM, the three hospitals went
on to found the Regional Academic Cancer Centre Utrecht (RAKU). Two
multidisciplinary teams now perform surgical procedures for complex liver,
stomach, bile duct and esophageal tumours at UMCU. Pancreas surgery is
performed at a location of the St. Antonius hospital, while all three hospitals
remain responsible for the minor, less complex liver resections. Note that the
actual distribution of surgical procedures thus differs from the initial plan. In
the actual situation, MMC only provides minor resections for liver cancer;
i.e. stomach procedures are transferred from MMC to UMCU. The reason
for the difference between the proposals and the actual situation is that the
health insurers consulted as part of the informal opinion suggested centralizing
both stomach and esophageal surgeries at one hospital, since this would
safeguard quality and patient safety, based on the literature. The hospitals
therefore decided to centralize both esophageal and stomach procedures at
UMCU.
21 These parties had insight into the same documents as the plan presented to the ACM. In its
assessment, the ACM attaches significant value to the opinions of the health insurers and client
councils.
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B. APPENDIX
A.2. Step-By-Step method for calculation of price effects
Column A:
∑
(Q2015×Price2015)
N(patients).
Column B:
∑
(Q2015×Price2017)
N(patients)
Column C:
∑
(Q2017×Price2017)
N(patients)
Column D (Stomach/esophegeal):
∑
(Q2017×Price2017 UMCU )
N(patients)
(Pancreas):
∑
(Q2017×Price2017 St Antonius)
N(patients)
1) We determined which DTC codes belonged to each surgical pro-
cedure, based on the public DTC website of the Dutch Healthcare
Authority (NZa).
2) We made use of the 2015 case- and treatment mix to calculate
the mean pre- collaboration prices. This means that we took the
population who underwent surgery in 2015 as the starting point for
the calculation of 2015 and 2017 prices, to allow for comparability
between the years (Column A and B)
3) We then acquired the negotiated hospital-health insurer prices for
each DTC code. We did this for the negotiated price in 2015 and
2017. Since hospitals negotiate the prices per DTC annually with
their insurer, the price per DTC was likely to be different for 2015
compared to 2017.
4) The total expenditure per hospital was calculated by summing the
number of DTCs performed in that hospital multiplied by the price
per DTC: ∑(QDTC×PDTC).
5) Themean pre-collaboration price per patient per hospital is calculated
by dividing the total expenditure per hospital per tumour (as calcu-
lated under point 3) by the number of treated patients:
∑
(QDTC×PDTC)
N(patients) .
We did this for 2015 and as a hypothetical benchmark also for 2017,
based on the 2015 case- and treatment mix
6) Based on mean prices for the three individual hospitals, we calculated
one mean price for the three hospitals, weighted for the number of
patients in each hospital.
7) We also conducted steps 1–5 for the nationwide control group. The
nationwide group refers to the mean price for patients treated by all
hospitals in the Netherlands that performed the procedure. The three
collaborating hospitals in our case were excluded from the nationwide
group.
8) We also conducted steps 1–5 for column C, making use of 2017 case-
mix and 2017 prices.
9) To calculate the post-collaboration price based on the consummated
as proposed centralization (ColumnD),wemade use of the 2017 case
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and treatment mix. We made use of 2017 prices for the hospital at
which the procedure would have been centralized. For stomach and
esophageal cancer, this was the UMCU, for pancreatic cancer, this
was the St. Antonius Hospital. The total expenditure was calculated
by summing the number of DTCs performed at the three hospitals,
multiplied by the price per DTC at the centralized hospital (UMCU
or St. Antonius Hospital): ∑(QDTC×PDTC centralized). The mean price was
computed by dividing the total expenditure by the total number of
patients.
10) Since the negotiated prices are confidential and competition-sensitive,
we report the price differences in Table 2 utilizing indices based on
the 2015 nationwide prices as the index (100). Therefore, indices
above 100 indicate a higher price, indices below 100 indicate a lower
price.
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